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LOCKED OUT: LOCKE V. DAVEYAND THE BROKEN
PROMISE OF EQUAL ACCESS
Richard F. Duncan*
"Let there be no doubt: This case is about discrimination against a religious
minority."'
"[T] he First Amendment ... does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of
orthodoxy over the classroom.... The classroom is peculiarly the
'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers
truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of
authoritative selection." 2
This Article is about two broken promises made to Joshua Davey
by his government: one a promise of equal educational opportunity
and the other a promise of religious liberty and equal access to fo-
rums for speech and expression created by government.
Even a young child knows that promises made by those who wield
power and authority over the promisee should be kept. However, the
promises of equal regard made to Joshua Davey by the State of Wash-
ington and the Supreme Court of the United States were broken.
Davey was stigmatized and singled out for discriminatory treatment-
by the State of Washington and with the imprimatur of the U.S. Su-
preme Court-solely because his chosen major, in an otherwise per-
mitted course of study, was being taught by his college professors
from a viewpoint that was "devotional in nature or designed to induce
religious faith . 3 Moreover, this suppression of disfavored ideas oc-
curred in the university, a place the Court has identified as "a tradi-
tional sphere of free expression... fundamental to the functioning
of our society.
4
Sherman S. Welpton, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law; I would
like to thank Michael Liskow for organizing this Law and Religion Symposium, Casey Duncan
for excellent research assistance, and John Tuskey and Michael McConnell for their generous
help. This Article is dedicated to my wife and best friend, Kelly Duncan: "If you needed me, I
would come to you, I'd swim the seas for to ease your pain."-Townes Van Zandt
I Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 733 (2004) (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
2 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting United States v. Associated
Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)) (alteration in original).
Davey, 540 U.S. at 716 (quoting Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 6, Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (No.
02-1315), 2003 WL 21715040).
4 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991).
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This Article seeks to determine whether the First Amendment's
protection of equal access to forums for speech and expression cre-
ated by government is violated by a scholarship program that can be
used to fund any course of study except "devotional theology."5
INTRODUCTION
On September 28, 1999, Washington Governor Gary Locke wrote
a letter to Joshua Davey congratulating Davey on his selection as a re-
cipient of a Promise Scholarship.6 Locke praised Davey for his "out-
standing academic achievements,"7 expressed enthusiasm about the
young man's "promising future,"" and explained why government
support of college education is essential to "meet the challenges," 9 of
life in the twenty-first century:
Education is the great equalizer in our society. Regardless of gender,
race, ethnicity or income, a quality education places all of us on a more
level playing field. I know this from personal experience. I was born into
an immigrant family and spent the first six years of my life in public hous-
ing. Like you, I worked hard in high school and graduated with honors.
I attended college and then law school. My education contributed
greatly to my success, and I am personally committed to providing the
best possible educational opportunities for the young people of the state
of Washington.'°
In light of what happened to Davey when he attempted to use his
Promise Scholarship to pursue his chosen course of study, Governor
Locke's paean to education as the "great equalizer"" seems almost
cruelly ironic.
The State of Washington created the Promise Scholarship Pro-
gram to assist academically gifted students from low and moderate
income families with the expenses of attending college. A Promise
Scholarship was awarded to students who graduated near the top of
their class from a public or private high school located in the State of
Washington, whose family income was less than 135% of the state's
median, and who enrolled at least half-time in an accredited college
or university located in the State of Washington.1 3 Since Davey met
all of these religiously-neutral requirements, he was awarded a Prom-
5 Davey, 540 U.S. at 717.
6 See Letter from Governor Gary Locke to Joshua Davey, Sept. 28, 1999, reprinted in Joint
Appendix at 55, Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (No. 02-1315), 2003 WL 21911178.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 56.
11 Id.
1 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 715-16 (2004).
i Id. at 716.
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ise Scholarship worth $1,125 for his first year of college and $1,542
for his second year.' 4 Promise Scholarships "are funded through the
State's general fund" and can be used to pay "any education-related
expense, including room and board."'5  However, when Davey en-
rolled in Northwest College 6 and attempted to use his Promise
Scholarship to defray his educational expenses, he discovered that
there was one additional requirement designed to protect the "liberty
of conscience"'17 of Washington taxpayers who oppose supporting the
education of prospective members of the clergy even under a gener-
ally-applicable scholarship program. This final requirement, which,
unlike the others, was most certainly not religiously-neutral, stated
that Promise Scholars could use their scholarships to pursue a degree
in any course of study except "a devotional theology degree." 8 Davey
could have majored in religious studies at the University of Washing-
ton and studied religion "from a historical and strictly scholarly point
of view,"' 9 but he could not major in the same course of study at
Northwest College because the Northwest faculty taught the courses
from a "devotional" perspective.
Davey, who had planned to pursue a double major at Northwest
College in "pastoral ministries and business management/admin-
istration, 2 ° was informed by Northwest's financial aid director that to
receive his Promise Scholarship funds he would be required to "cer-
tify in writing that he was not pursuing" a degree in devotional the-
ology at the college. Since he had no intention of foregoing an edu-
14 Id. The scholarship is awarded for the first year of postsecondary education and is renew-
able for one year.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 717 (stating that Davey enrolled at Northwest College, which is a private Christian
college that is eligible under the Promise Scholarship Program).
17 Id. at 722 (citing F. LAMBERT, THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN
AMERICA 188 (2003)).
18 Davey, 540 U.S. at 717. The exclusion of devotional theology majors is required by the
Washington State Constitution. Id. at 719 ("No public money or property shall be appropriated
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious
establishment." (quoting WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11)).
19 Declaration of Eugene Webb, Aug. 9, 2000, reprinted injoint Appendix, supra note 6, at 85.
Dr. Webb is a Professor at the University of Washington who teaches religion classes at the Uni-
versity. Dr. Webb was very emphatic in stating that "[n]one of our courses are devotional in
nature or designed to induce religious faith." Id. at 84. Indeed, he stated:
[W]hen students raise questions about the truth or ultimate reality of religious ideas, I
remind them that our concern in these courses is not with truth but only with the mean-
ings of the ideas-that is, the various ways in which they have been interpreted and rein-
terpreted over time in the lives of religious communities.
Id. In other words, at the University of Washington, religion is studied from an agnostic view-
point "as an aspect of the general intellectual and cultural history of societies and civilizations."
Id.
20 Davey, 540 U.S. at 717.
21 Id.
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cation in pastoral ministries, he refused to sign the certification form,
and, as a result, his Promise Scholarship was lost and he received no
funds.
Davey sued in federal court claiming that the rule denying Prom-
ise Scholarship funds to students who declare a major in devotional
theology is unconstitutional religious and viewpoint discrimination
under the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the U.S. Consti-
tution.3 The federal district court ruled against Davey, but a divided
panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and held that
the State of Washington violated the Free Exercise Clause by target-
ing devotional theology majors such as Davey for exclusion from the
Promise Scholarship Program.24 The Supreme Court granted certio-
25rari, reversed the Ninth Circuit, and held that a narrow exclusion
denying state funding for "vocational religious instruction, 26 does not
violate the free exercise rights of students, such as Davey,27 who are
pursuing "religious instruction that will prepare [them] for the minis-
tr-,28
Although the only issue before the Court in Davey was the free ex-
ercise issue, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion contains dic-
tum that rejects, by conclusory assertion, Davey's argument "that the
Promise Scholarship Program is an unconstitutional viewpoint re-
striction on speech. 2 9  The purpose of this Article is to focus on
Footnote Three of the Rehnquist opinion in Davey and this important
dictum concerning the Free Speech Clause and viewpoint restrictions
contained in scholarship programs funding the post-secondary edu-
cation of scholars like Joshua Davey. Although the Court's dictum in
Davey was nearly devoid of reasoning, I will attempt to fill that void by
22 Id.
23 Id. at 718 ("He argued the denial of his scholarship based on his decision to pursue a the-
ology degree violated, inter alia, the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech Clauses of
the First Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
24 Id. (discussing the conclusions drawn by the Ninth Circuit); see also Davey v. Locke, 299
F.3d 748, 757-60 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that Washington's Promise Scholarship Program was
unconstitutional).
25 Davey, 299 F.3d 748, cert. granted, 538 U.S. 1031 (2003) (granting certiorari only on the
question of whether the Free Exercise Clause mandates that the State of Washington fund reli-
gious instruction if it provides scholarships for secular college instruction); accord Davey, 540
U.S. at 719 (identifying the issue presented as whether Washington can deny funds to students
preparing for the ministry without violating the Free Exercise Clause).
26 Davey, 540 U.S. at 725.
27 Id. at 719.
28 Id.; see also id. at 725 ("Given the historic and substantial state interest at issue, we there-
fore cannot conclude that the denial of funding for vocational religious instruction alone is in-
herently constitutionally suspect.").
29 Id. at 720 n.3 (asserting that "the Promise Scholarship Program is not a forum for
speech," making the Court's speech forum precedents inapplicable).
[Vol. 8:4
LOCKED OLFT
analyzing Davey's free speech argument against the Promise Scholar-
ship Program's exclusion of students pursuing a degree in devotional
theology.
In Davey, a Promise Scholarship could be used by the recipient to
fund any course of study except a major in "devotional theology."30
Was it reasonable for Davey to believe that this restriction constituted
viewpoint discrimination by the State, striking at the core of educa-
tional free speech in "the university [which] is a traditional sphere of
free expression... fundamental to the functioning of our society?"3'
If this does not seem to pose a serious threat to freedom of speech in
academia, imagine a similar state scholarship program that can be
used to fund any course of study except "gender studies from a femi-
nist perspective." Does this twist better highlight free speech con-
cerns? Should the cases be decided the same? Or should one come
out in favor of the restriction and the other in favor of free speech?
If the latter, how would you defend treating the cases differently?
Does one case involve viewpoint discrimination and the other merely
exclusion of a particular subject matter? Does the scholarship pro-
gram create a public forum for speech in one case, but not in the
other?3  Suppose a state imposes an annual tax of $500 on students
pursuing a college degree in theology from a devotional perspective
or gender studies from a feminist perspective. Is this tax on certain
educational perspectives unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination?
If so, how is this different from discriminatory exclusions from schol-
arships? These are only some of the questions that should have
been-but were not-considered by the Court in Davey, and they are
questions that I hope to address in this Article.
I. THE FREE EXERCISE ISSUE: A BRIEF DETOUR
A. What the Establishment Clause Permits and What the Free Exercise
Clause Requires
In order to understand what was at stake in Davey, observe first
that the Court strongly declared "there is no doubt that the State
could, consistent with the Federal Constitution, permit Promise
.oId. at 717.
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991).
32 Other variations on the hypothetical posed in the text might include a scholarship that
could be used to fund any major except "evolutionary biology" or "queer studies." Are these
restrictions permissible under the First Amendment? Or, even better, consider a scholarship
program that takes a 180 degree turn from the one in Davey and permits funding for any major
"except non-devotional theology." Does this restriction violate the Establishment and Free
Speech Clauses because it prefers "devotional" theology over "non-devotional" theology? Is not
this exactly the claim Joshua Davey made (in reverse) in Davey?
Aug. 2006]
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Scholars to pursue a degree in devotional theology."33 Religious lib-
erty has come a long way since the triumph of strict separationism
and the "no-aid" principle in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 4 and, under cases
like Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind5 and Zelman
v. Simmons-Harris,6 it is now clear that generally applicable and non-
discriminatory scholarships and vouchers do not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause when recipients, exercising "independent and pri-
vate choice,"37 employ them to pay for religious education at private
religious schools.
Davey is not a case about whether the Establishment Clause per-
mits states to provide scholarships for both religious and secular
higher education. Nondiscriminatory scholarships covering both
secular and religious schools are clearly permitted under the U.S.
Constitution.
Instead, Joshua Davey asked the Court to hold that the Promise
Scholarship Program violated the Free Exercise Clause because it dis-
criminated against devotional theology majors by explicitly excluding
them from funding available to all other courses of study.- In other
words, "[t] he holding in Locke v. Davey concerns what the state must
fund."39
Davey's free exercise argument was a strong one that should have
prevailed under the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence. In its
1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court
held that the Free Exercise Clause does not protect religious liberty
against restrictive laws that are both neutral and generally applicable.
However, as the Court expressly emphasized in Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah,' "[a] law burdening religious practice that
is not neutral or not of general application must undergo the most
53 Davey, 540 U.S. at 719 (emphasis added).
N 403 U.S. 602 (1971). For a discussion of the "no aid" principle, which prohibited the use
of tax funds to support religious activities or institutions, see Douglas Laycock, Commentary,
Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes But Missing
the Liberty, 118 HARv. L. REV. 155, 162-67 (2004) (providing an overview of the history of the
"no aid" principle).
55 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
536 U.S. 639 (2002).
57 Davey, 540 U.S. at 719. One commentator refers to this vindication of neutrality and indi-
vidual educational choice as springing from the Court's "constitutional theory of religious tol-
erance." Susanna Dokupil, Function Follows Form: Locke v. Davey's Unnecessary Parsing, 2003-
2004 CATO Sup. CT. REV. 327, 335.
See Davey, 540 U.S. at 720 (arguing that "the program is presumptively unconstitutional
because it is not facially neutral with respect to religion").
39 Laycock, supra note 34, at 171 (emphasis added).
40 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
41 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
[Vol. 8:4
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rigorous of scrutiny. 42 Moreover, the Court in Lukumi clearly stated
that "the minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not dis-
criminate on its face. Since the Promise Scholarship Program fa-
cially targeted devotional theology majors for discriminatory exclu-
sion from funding, Davey's free exercise claim should have been an
easy and certain winner under Smith and Lukumi. Justice Scalia, the
author of the majority opinion in Smith, certainly thought so. 4 How-
ever, by a surprising vote of 7-2, the Supreme Court rejected Davey's
free exercise claim and upheld Washington's decision to exclude de-
votional theology majors from its Promise Scholarship Program.5
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, at least on its face, is a
very narrow one limited essentially to the facts of the case-to "the
Promise Scholarship Program as currently operated by the State of
Washington. 4 6 Although the opinion is mortally under-reasoned, it
appears to be based on three separate factors: the "relatively minor
burden 4 7 the restriction placed on Promise Scholars such as Davey,
the State's interest in hewing to historical tradition against taxpayer
funds being used to subsidize "religious education for the ministry,"
and the Court's desire to create room for "play in the joints" between
what the Establishment Clause permits and what the Free Exercise
49Clause requires.
Although the primary focus of this Article is on the free speech-
not the free exercise-issue in Davey, I will first briefly discuss the
Court's unpersuasive attempt to explain its rejection of Davey's reli-
gious liberty claim.
42 Id. at 546. See generally Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise Is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise:
Smith, Lukumi and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 850 (2001) (analyz-
ing the general applicability standard).
43 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533.
44 See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 726-27 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Promise Scholarship Program is facially discriminatory toward religion and that the majority's
holding is irreconcilable with previous decisions). Professor Laycock has summarized the logic
of Davey's powerful argument as follows: "[I]f funding is permitted and discrimination is for-
bidden, it seemed to follow that a discriminatory refusal to fund is forbidden." Laycock, supra
note 34, at 156.
45 See Davey, 540 U.S. at 725 (finding the Promise Scholarship Program "as currently oper-
ated by the State of Washington" not "inherently constitutionally suspect" and determining the
State's interest in not funding the pursuit of devotional theology degrees to outweigh the "rela-
tively minor burden" on Promise Scholars).
46 Id. Susanna Dokupil reads Davey as upholding the state's restrictions "on the narrowest
possible grounds, effectively confining [the holding in Davey] to its facts." Dokupil, supra note
37, at 334.
47 Davey, 540 U.S. at 725.
48 Id. at 721. The Washington Supreme Court has explained that its "state constitution pro-
hibits the taxpayers from being put in the position of paying for the religious instruction of as-
pirants to the clergy with whose religious views they may disagree." Witters v. State Comm'n for
the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119, 1120 (Wash. 1989).
49 Davey, 540 U.S. at 719.
Aug. 2006]
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B. Free Exercise Burdens and Scholarships for Clergy
Davey claimed that his free exercise rights were violated by the
Promise Scholarship Program because it was "not facially neutral with
respect to religion" and was, therefore, presumptively unconstitu-
tional under Lukumi. 0 However, the Court slipped quickly away from
Lukumi by noting that in Davey the law's "disfavor of religion" did not
involve criminal or civil penalties but rather was "of a far milder
kind."5' Incredibly, Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that the state did
not even require Promise Scholars such as Davey "to choose between
their religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit.02 Rather,
said the Court, Washington had "merely chosen not to fund a distinct
category of instruction.'
53
Any reasonable observer of the facts in Davey must respond with
incredulity to Rehnquist's highly selective and conclusory description
of the burden on religious liberty imposed by the Promise Scholar-
ship's exclusion of otherwise eligible students who chose to major in
devotional theology. The state undoubtedly targeted this tiny minor-
ity of scholars and forced them to choose between a large govern-
ment benefit designed to create a "more level playing field" of educa-
tional opportunity54 and the free exercise of their religious beliefs.
When Joshua Davey chose to follow his religious beliefs by declaring a
major in pastoral ministries at Northwest College, the State of Wash-
ington penalized him by taking away his scholarship and the educa-
tional funds he otherwise would have received. Under Sherbert v.
Verner 5 and its progeny,56 when a state conditions a generally available
governmental benefit 57-such as unemployment compensation or
50 Id. at 720.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 720-21.
53 Id. at 721.
54 Letter from Governor Gary Locke to Joshua Davey, supra note 6, at 56.
55 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
56 See Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 832-33 (1989) (holding that
denial of unemployment benefits to a man who refused to accept a position that required him
to work on Sundays was a violation of his right to free exercise, even though the man's religious
convictions were the product of his personal religious beliefs and not of any established reli-
gious denomination); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 146 (1987)
(finding an undue burden on the right to free exercise in the denial of unemployment benefits
to a woman who was terminated because her religious beliefs precluded her from working cer-
tain scheduled hours); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981) (holding that state's
denial of unemployment benefits to a man who terminated his employment because his relig-
ion forbids his involvement in the production of armaments placed an undue burden on the
right to free exercise of religion).
57 See Davey, 540 U.S. at 727 (Scalia,J., dissenting) (noting that the Promise Scholarship Pro-
gram is "a generally available public benefit" that was awarded to all students who met objective
standards involving "academic performance, income, and attendance at an accredited school");
Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L.
[Vol. 8:4
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scholarship funds--on the recipient's willingness to perform some
act that her religion counsels against, or to refrain from some act that
her religion motivates her to do, there exists a constitutionally suffi-
cient burden on the free exercise of religion."'
In his dissent in Davey, Justice Scalia argued persuasively that the
State of Washington had, in effect, "imposed a special tax" on devo-
tional theology majors by "carv[ing] out a solitary.. . exclusion" from
generally available educational benefits. 9 Similarly, the Court in
Sherbert held it was "clear" that a burden on free exercise was imposed
by the State of South Carolina when it forced a Sabbatarian, such as
Sherbert, to choose between unemployment benefits and following
the precepts of her religion by refraining from work on Saturday.
The Court said that the condition was coercive and amounted to "the
same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a
fine imposed" on Saturday worship.
61
What makes the burden on Davey even more substantial is the
stigmatic injury of being singled out as an outsider, as one who is
deemed unworthy by his government of receiving a scholarship made
available to every other student pursuing any other program of
62
study. Indeed, after Smith and Lukumi "converted the right to free
exercise of religion into some kind of non-discrimination right,, 63 the
kind of burden that ought to matter most is the harm caused by un-
equal access to a generally available benefit determined "solely on the
basis of religion."' ° Even a tiny economic harm is magnified greatly
when a small minority is singled out on the basis of religion and de-
REV. 933, 977-82 (1989) (explaining that "undue burden" cases support the notion that the
right to free exercise comports with the modern view of a universal or generally-available gov-
ernment benefit as an "entitlement" or property right).
See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403-04 (opining that a statute which burdens the practice of relig-
ion-even indirectly by means of a disqualification for government benefits-is unconstitu-
tional). The burden consists of the coercive pressure on students, like Davey, to forego pursu-
ing a degree in devotional theology in order to receive scholarship funds. See Thomas C. Berg
& Douglas Laycock, The Mistakes in Locke v. Davey and the Future of State Payments for Services Pro-
vided by Religious Institutions, 40 TuLSA L. REv. 227, 235 (2004) (noting that "[d) iscriminatory
funding is always the worst policy, because it pressures citizens to adapt their own religious
choices to the state's favored categories").
59 Davey, 540 U.S. at 727 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
60 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
61 Id. at 404.
62 By targeting devotional theology majors for discriminatory exclusion from a scholarship
program available to all others, the State of Washington sends a message to students like Davey
"that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
63 Laycock, supra note 34, at 171; see Duncan, supra note 42, at 880 (noting that the two cases
"transformed the Free Exercise Clause from a liberty rule... to an equality rule").
64 Davey, 540 U.S. at 727 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
Aug. 2006]
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nied equal treatment.65 Davey's lost scholarship, of course, was much
more than a small economic harm. It was a substantial sum of money
designed to create a "more level playing field" by making higher edu-
cation affordable for students from low and moderate income fami-
lies.66
The only socially redeeming quality of the Court's opinion in
Davey is its extreme narrowness. The Rehnquist opinion seemed to
say that Davey was asking for too much too soon. His lawsuit asked
the Court to hold "that what had long been constitutionally prohib-
ited, and had only just been constitutionally permitted, was now con-
stitutionally required."67 The Court held that at least for the present
there must be room for "play in the joints" 68 for the states to hew to
historical traditions against using tax funds to pay for the education
and support of the clergy.69 The Court went out of its way to empha-
size that "the Promise Scholarship Program goes a long way toward
including religion in its benefits" by permitting students to attend
"pervasively religious schools" and to take "devotional theology
courses" so long as they don't seek to prepare for a clerical vocation
by choosing a major in devotional theology.71
In the fullness of time, Davey will probably be understood as a nar-
row and temporary pause on the Court's inexorable journey toward
neutrality under the Constitution's religion clauses. There is no
doubt that the Establishment Clause permits devotional theology ma-
jors to receive neutral educational benefits,72 and there should be no
doubt that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits states from targeting
theology students for discriminatory exclusion. As Justice Scalia put
it, "[i]f the Religion Clauses demand neutrality, we must enforce
them, in hard cases as well as easy ones.
"
,7
r, See, e.g., id. at 731 ("The indignity of being singled out for special burdens on the basis of
one's religious calling is so profound that the concrete harm produced can never be dismissed
as insubstantial.").
66 See supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also Davey, 540 U.S. at 731 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) ("[W]hen the State exacts a financial penalty of almost $3,000 for religious exercise-
whether by tax or by forfeiture of an otherwise available benefit-religious practice is anything
but free.").
67 Laycock, supra note 34, at 158.
r8 Davey, 540 U.S. at 719.
69 See id. at 721-23 (stressing that the Program was merely making a distinction between vo-
cational "education for the ministry" and "other callings or professions").
70 Id. at 724.
71 Id. at 724-25.
72 See id. at 729 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Perhaps some formally neutral public benefits pro-
grams are so gerrymandered and devoid of plausible secular purpose that they might raise spec-
ters of state aid to religion, but an evenhanded Promise Scholarship Program is not among
them."); supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
73 Davey, 540 U.S. at 728 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
[Vol. 8:4
LOCKED OUT
II. FOOTNOTE THREE: FREE SPEECH AND VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION
The only issue directly before the Court in Davey was whether the
discriminatory exclusion of devotional theology majors from the
Promise Scholarship Program violated the Free Exercise Clause.74
However, Davey also contended that the restriction violated the Free
Speech Clause because it discriminated against educational speech
on the basis of viewpoint.
75
In brief and largely unreasoned dictum, the Court rejected
Davey's free speech claim because "the Promise Scholarship Program
is not a forum for speech."76 The Court explained this conclusory as-
sertion with yet another unsupported conclusion-the Scholarship
Program was not a speech forum because its purpose was merely to
help low- and moderate-income students pay for college, not to "en-
courage a diversity of views from private speakers.",77 In other words,
higher education is a product or a service, like low-income housing,
surplus cheese, or health care, not an open and diverse marketplace
of ideas.
If Chief Justice Rehnquist's dictum in Davey hardens into Free
Speech Clause doctrine, it is not only supporters of equal treatment
for religious education who ought to be concerned. The Court has
made clear that "private religious speech, far from being a First
Amendment orphan, is as fully protected under the Free Speech
Clause as secular private expression. 76 Moreover, the Court's dictum
in Davey was based upon its conclusion that a scholarship program is
not a forum for private expression, thus the Free Speech Clause does
not apply even when exclusions from educational benefits are based
upon the viewpoint of the student's chosen major.
To put this in sharper focus, consider three different scholarship
programs, each with its own unique exclusion:
74 See id. at 719 (majority opinion).
75 See id. at 720 n.3 (noting that Davey was relying on Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univer-
sity of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) for his free speech argument).
76 Id.
77 Id. The following quotation constitutes the entirety of Rehnquist's dictum on the free
speech issue:
Davey, relying on Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. Of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995),
contends that the Promise Scholarship Program is an unconstitutional viewpoint restric-
tion on speech. But the Promise Scholarship Program is not a forum for speech. The
purpose of the Promise Scholarship Program is to assist students from low- and middle-
income families with the cost of postsecondary education, not to "'encourage a diversity
of views from private speakers.'" United States v. American Library Assn., Inc., 539 U.S. 194,
206 (2003) (plurality opinion) (quoting Rosenberger, supra, at 834). Our cases dealing
with speech forums are simply inapplicable. See American Library Assn., supra; Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 805 (1985).
Id.
78 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995).
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Program One
Program One is the Promise Scholarship Program from Davey, a
generally applicable scholarship that can be used to fund any course
of study except "devotional theology."
Program Two
Program Two is also a generally applicable scholarship, but the re-
striction is different-this scholarship can be used to fund any course
of study except "gender studies from a feminist perspective."
Program Three
Program Three is like the others except it can be used to fund any
course of study except "political science from a socialist perspective."
If the dictum in Footnote Three of Davey controls, the Free
Speech Clause does not apply in any of these cases, because a scholar-
ship program is merely the delivery of a product or service, and is not
designed to create a forum or to encourage a diversity of views from
private speakers. Moreover, since the Free Speech Clause provides
the same protection to private religious speech and private secular
speech, there is no reason to think the forum rule should mean one
thing when applied to Program One and something else when ap-
plied to Programs Two and Three.
A. The Categories of Public and Nonpublic Fora
The Supreme Court has classified government property opened to
private expression as fitting into one of three categories of fora: such
government property will be classified as either a traditional public
forum, a designated public forum, or a nonpublic forum. A tradi-
tional public forum is a place, such as a park or a public street, that
has "immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and,
time out of mind, ha[s] been used for purposes of assembly, commu-
nicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public ques-
tions."7 A second category of forum is the designated or limited pub-
lic forum. Such a public forum is created when government
purposefully opens its property for public expression by part or all of
79 Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (quoting Hague
v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
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the public. s0 Finally, a nonpublic forum exists when government
opens its property for certain communicative purposes, but does not
intend to create a designated public forum."'
In the case of a limited public forum, government may not ex-
clude "a speaker who falls within the class to which a designated pub-
lic forum is made generally available," 2 nor "may it discriminate
against speech on the basis of its viewpoint."8, In the case of a non-
public forum, the government may restrict access "as long as the re-
strictions are reasonable and [are] not an effort to suppress expres-
sion merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view.
''4
Significandy, although the government may exclude speech from
even a limited public forum on the basis of subject matter,' viewpoint
discrimination is prohibited in both public and nonpublic fora.
B. Scholarships as Fora for Private Speech
Chief Justice Rehnquist and the majority in Davey said that the
Promise Scholarship Program did not create a forum for speech be-
cause it was not intended by the State of Washington "to encourage a
diversity of views from private speakers." 6 What did he mean by this?
Did he mean that the Scholarship Program was designed to fund
government speech, as opposed to private speech? Did he mean that
education is not really speech, perhaps because he views higher edu-
cation as merely a credentialing service designed to help young Dil-
80 See id. (explaining the second category of public property "which the State has opened for
use by the public as a place for expressive activity"); see also Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v.
Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998) (discussing the creation of a designated public forum by "pur-
poseful governmental action").
81 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 803 (1995) (high-
lighting the Court's past decisions regarding public forums). The court in Cornelius explains:
Not every instrumentality used for communication, however, is a traditional public
forum or a public forum by designation.... We will not find that a public forum has
been created in the face of clear evidence of a contrary intent,... nor will we infer that
the government intended to create a public forum when the nature of the property is
inconsistent with expressive activity.
Id.
2 See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677 (explaining that such governmental action would then be sub-
ject to strict scrutiny).
83 Rosenberger v. Regents & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995); see also Good
News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001) ("The restriction must not discrimi-
nate against speech on the basis of viewpoint....").
84 Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677-78 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800); see also Lamb's Chapel v.
Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392-93 (1993) (emphasizing that, even in a
nonpublic forum, restrictions on access must be "viewpoint neutral").
85 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-30 (stating that subject matter discrimination is permissible
"if it preserves the purposes" of a limited public forum, but "viewpoint discrimination ... is pre-
sumed impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within the forum's limitations").
86 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720 n.3 (2004) (citing United States v. Am. Library Ass'n,
539 U.S. 194, 206 (2003) (plurality opinion)).
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berts achieve a better place in the corporate rat race? Did he mean
that accredited colleges and universities in the State of Washington
do not offer Promise Scholars a "diversity of views" to select from
when choosing a program of study? Or did he mean nothing at all
when he pushed an important free speech issue out of his way with
the brief dictum in Footnote Three?
To begin at the beginning, let's try to answer the first of these
questions by analyzing whether the Promise Scholarship Program was
intended to fund a diversity of private views about science, philoso-
phy, social science, history, and literature-to name just a few of the
subjects that Promise Scholars study under the Program. The reason
this question is controlling is that the Court has already held, in the
landmark case of Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Vir-
ginia,s7 that when a state university establishes a funding program for
student publications it creates a "metaphysical"8 8 limited public forum
and may not "discriminate against speech on the basis of its view-
point.
89
If the Davey majority had made a rational attempt to apply Rosen-
berger-instead of merely casting it aside without thoughtful analysis-
it would have had no choice but to uphold Davey's free speech chal-
lenge. Indeed, Davey's First Amendment argument was stronger
than Rosenberger's. The Promise Scholarship Program restricted
educative speech on the basis of viewpoint in a "metaphysical" forum
intended to encourage an infinitely broad spectrum of private ex-
pression at the core of the First Amendment's protection of the mar-
ketplace of ideas. Rosenberger cannot be distinguished from Davey. If
it is law, then a fortiori Davey's claim is valid and Rehnquist's dictum
in Footnote Three is wrong.
1. The Metaphysical Forum in Rosenberger
In Rosenberger, the University of Virginia collected mandatory "ac-
tivity fees" from students for the purpose of providing "financial sup-
port for student organizations that are related to the educational
purpose of the University of Virgin[i]a."90 The University Guidelines
for Student Activities Fund ("SAF") distribution provided a category
of funding for "student news, information, opinion, entertainment,
or academic communications media groups."9' Fifteen student
87 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819.
88 Id. at 830 (stating that, although a funding forum is "metaphysical" rather than "spatial or
geographic," the same legal protections for speech apply).
89 Id. at 829.
90 Affidavit of Ronald J. Stump, reprinted in Joint Appendix at 69, Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819
(No. 94-329).
91 Rosenbeiger, 515 U.S. at 824 (citation omitted).
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groups were funded under this student publications category,92 in-
cluding the Virginia Environmental Law Journal, the Virginia Advocate,
and the Journal of Law & Politics.93 However, funding was denied for
Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia 9 4 because
Wide Awake "promote[d] or manifest[ed] a particular belie[f] in or
about a deity or an ultimate reality. 95 In other words, although Wide
Awake published articles on permissible topics, 96 the University re-
fused SAF funding because the journal's Christian viewpoint was a
"prohibited perspective." 97
Although the expressed purpose of SAF funding was to "enhance
the University environment" and to support the "educational purpose
of the University,"9 not to promote the opinions of student speakers,
the Court held that the SAF funding of student journals created a
limited public forum because the program "expends funds to en-
courage a diversity of views from private speakers." 99  The Court
clearly held that the government "may not discriminate based on the
viewpoint of private persons whose speech it facilitates."' 9 In other
words, when a program in fact provides funding to facilitate private
speech from a diversity of views, a metaphysical public forum for
speech is created even if the government has other goals or reasons
for pursuing the funding program. Once such a forum exists, a "bla-
tant" violation of the Free Speech Clause occurs "[w]hen the gov-
ernment targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by
speakers on a subject."'91
92 Id. at 825.
Joint Appendix, supra note 90, at 50, 64 (reprinting the school's student group budget
allocations for the 1989-90 school year).
94 Funding was sought by petitioner Ronald Rosenberger on behalf of Wide Awake Produc-
tions, a registered student organization at the University that was established to publish a jour-
nal "of philosophical and religious expression" and to communicate "a Christian perspective on
both personal and community issues, especially those relevant to college students at the Univer-
sity of Virginia." Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 825-27 (citations omitted).
Id. at 827 (citation omitted).
96 See, e.g., id. at 826, 831 (noting that Wide Awake published articles on racism, stress, crisis
pregnancies, homosexuality, prayer, eating disorders, music reviews, and interviews with profes-
sorsV.
9 Id. at 831.
98 Id. at 824 (citations omitted).
99 Id. at 834.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 829. Government may not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint in the context of a
funding program if the program is "designed to facilitate private speech, not to promote a gov-
ernmental message." Legal Serv. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542 (2001) (holding that
Congress's prohibition of local recipients of Legal Services Corporation ("LSC") funds from
engaging in representation involving efforts to amend or otherwise challenge validity of existing
welfare laws was impermissible viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment,
even though the program does not create even a limited public forum); see also StuartJ. Lark,
Religious Expression, Government Funds, and the First Amendment, 105 W. VA. L. REv. 317, 330-33
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The Promise Scholarship Program in Davey is clearly designed to
encourage Promise Scholars to choose from the infinitely broad se-
lection of subjects, viewpoints, and courses of study that constitute
the marketplace of ideas of higher education in the State of Washing-
ton. As Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledges-in another context-
in his majority opinion in Davey, the Promise Scholarship Program
was designed to facilitate "the independent and private choice of re-
102cipients" concerning the education they wished to pursue.
A college education is not merely a product or chattel like surplus
cheese or prescription drugs; rather it is not only speech, but speech
of the highest and purest form.1 0 3 It is philosophy, science, history,
literature, art, and, yes, even theology. It is a search for truth and
knowledge by reading, writing, thinking, and debating about-and
sifting through-all viewpoints, all perspectives, and all arguments on
all subjects and all disciplines. It is one thing for a state to fund
Cheddar, but not Muenster cheese; it is a very different thing for the
state to fund theology from an agnostic, but not from a believing
point of view.
As the Court itself has said so well on many occasions, because
"the university is a traditional sphere of free expression. . . funda-
mental to the functioning of our society," 10 4 the "First Amend-
ment.., does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom."' 5 The First Amendment's "special concern"'6 for free
expression on campus is deeply offended when government seeks to
control educative speech "by means of conditions attached to the ex-
penditure of Government funds;"' °7 the education of our Nation's fu-
ture leaders should consist of a "robust exchange of ideas" from a
"multitude of tongues," not only from those voices approved by "any
kind of authoritative selection."'
When the government discriminates on the basis of viewpoint in
scholarship programs like Washington's Promise Scholarship, it se-
(2003) (summarizing the Velazquez holding); F. Philip Manns, Jr., Finding the 'Tree Play" Between
the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, 71 TENN. L. REV. 657, 682-83 (2004) (analyzing the Ve-
lazquez holding).
102 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 719 (2004); see also Dokupil, supra note 37, at 344 (by pro-
viding scholarships "for any course of study (except one), the state has facilitated [private] ex-
pressive conduct").
103 See Laycock, supra note 34, at 191 ("Education consists largely of the transmission and ex-
change of information and viewpoints[, activities that are] ... central concerns of the First
Amendment.").
104 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991).
105 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
106 Id.
107 Rust, 500 U.S. at 200.
108 Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372
(S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
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verely distorts the marketplace of ideas in higher education. By ex-
cluding devotional theology majors from the program, "the state cre-
ated an incentive for students not to pursue that major and instead to
pursue a major less infused with religious teaching.' °9 What is worse,
this distortion of educational choice "might induce some students
committed to a religion major to choose a college whose approach to
the study of religion is more secular and less devotional."' 0 Under
the Free Speech Clause, such distortion of the educational market-
place of ideas is impermissible. Harm to intellectual freedom in the
university system is "minimized when the state funds" no educational
viewpoints, or when it funds all educational viewpoints "within a neu-
trally defined category.""' By contrast, the policy adopted by the
State of Washington distorted the expressive marketplace and un-
dermined intellectual freedom by targeting one perspective for dis-
criminatory exclusion.
2. Viewpoint Discrimination
Although government scholarship programs may permissibly se-
lect certain subjects for favorable treatment, they may not discrimi-
nate against private educational choices on the basis of viewpoint.
For example, the state may decide to create a scholarship program
for students who major in political science, but may not withhold
funding from students who major in political science from a socialist
perspective."'
2
Viewpoint discrimination strikes at the core of "the most basic val-
ues underlying the First Amendment."' '1 As Marjorie Heins has
stated:
These values include the right to think, believe, and speak freely, the fos-
tering of intellectual and spiritual growth, and the free exchange of ideas
necessary to a properly functioning democracy. Government action that
suppresses or burdens speech on the basis of its viewpoint threatens all of
these values by skewing public debate, retarding democratic change, de-
priving people of ideas and artistic experiences that could contribute to
their growth, and otherwise constricting human liberty.1
4
M Berg & Laycock, supra note 58, at 235.
110 Id. (suggesting that Davey creates an incentive for colleges "to tip their religion courses
from the devotional toward the secular" to ensure that their students are not disqualified from
receiving Promise Scholarships).
III Id.
112 See supra note 101 and accompanying text; see also Rosenberger v. Regents & Visitors of
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
,S Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 100 (1996).
114 Id. (citations omitted).
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In Rosenberger, Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court emphasized
that "[w] hen the government targets not subject matter, but particu-
lar views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First
Amendment is all the more blatant."
1 5
Although the precise line between permissible subject matter and
impermissible viewpoint restrictions on speech is not always easy to
locate, 6 the restrictions in Davey, like those in Rosenberger, clearly
constitute viewpoint discrimination. This is because the government
has classified religion or theology as permissible subjects for fund-
ing,' 7 but in one case "select[ed] for disfavored treatment""8 student
journals with "religious editorial viewpoints ' " 9 and in the other case
disfavored the study of theology from a devotional perspective.
2 0
• • • 121
This viewpoint discrimination is an egregious subset of subject mat-
ter discrimination, and it is "presumptively unconstitutional in fund-
11122ing, as in other contexts.
Of course, viewpoint discrimination is permissible when the gov-
ernment transmits its own messages or "when it enlists private entities
to convey [the government's] own message.' ' 3 For example, the gov-
ernment may spend public money to encourage other nations to em-
brace democracy and liberty without thereby being "constitutionally
required to fund a program to encourage competing lines of political
philosophy such as communism and fascism.' 2 4  However, this dis-
tinction does not support Chief Justice Rehnquist's conclusory judg-
ment in Davey.'
2 5
Davey is not a case, like Rust v. Sullivan126 or United States v. Ameri-
can Library Assn,12 1 in which the government is funding the dissemi-
115 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
Id. at 831 ("[I]t must be acknowledged [that] the distinction is not a precise one.").
117 See supra text accompanying notes 12-22, 30-101 for a discussion of the Davey and Rosen-
berger decisions.
8 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
119 Id.
120 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 717 (2004).
121 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831 ("[V]iewpoint discrimination is the proper way to interpret
the University's objections .... The prohibited [religious] perspective, not the general subject
matter, resulted in the refusal to make third-party payments.... "); see also Dokupil, supra note
37, at 340 (arguing that in Davey, Washington State "first singled out 'theology,' then inter-
preted that word even more narrowly to single out that subset of theology majors who actually
believe the material").
12 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830 (citation omitted).
123 Id. at 833.
124 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991).
125 See Laycock, supra note 34, at 194 ("The subsidized speech was private for purposes of this
distinction for the same reason that funding would have been permissible: Davey's choice of
major was not state action." (citation omitted)).
126 Rust, 500 U.S. 173.
127 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
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nation of its own message12 or selecting, for circulation in a public li-
brary, books or other materials "of requisite and appropriate quality
for educational and informational purposes."' 29 If the State of Wash-
ington had decided not to fund the study of devotional theology at a
state university or public school, that would be an example of the
state deciding on the content of its own speech. The Promise Schol-
arship Program in Davey, however, was designed to facilitate "the in-
dependent and private choice of recipients" regarding the courses of
study they wished to pursue at any public or private college, as the
Court itself admitted when it concluded that the Program was clearly
permissible under the Establishment Clause.'
30
It seems that Footnote Three of the Rehnquist opinion in Davey is
difficult to justify. Is there any possible reading of the opinion that
might save it from incoherence?
Is it possible that Chief Justice Rehnquist believed that the Prom-
ise Scholarship Program did not discriminate on the basis of view-
point, but rather on some other, legitimate basis? In Regan v. Taxa-
tion with Representation of Washington, for instance, the Court held that
the denial of tax-exempt status to a non-profit corporation organized
to promote its view of federal tax policy did not violate the First
Amendment because it was a result of Congress's viewpoint neutral
policy of refusing to subsidize lobbying. '' Similarly, in Arkansas Edu-
cational Television Commission v. Forbes, the Court held that a public
television broadcaster's decision to exclude a candidate from a tele-
vised debate because he had negligible public support was a "reason-
able, viewpoint-neutral" decision and thus consistent with the First
Amendment. -3 Perhaps Chief Justice Rehnquist saw an analogous
viewpoint-neutral basis for the exclusion of devotional theology ma-
jors from the Program. In other words, perhaps he understood the
exclusion of "devotional theology majors" from the Program as a
proxy for "the class of students training to become professional
128 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 193 ("[T]he Government has not discriminated on the basis of view-
point; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.").
19 Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. at 211. American Library Ass'n is a case about government's
power to control its own speech by making decisions about "collection acquisition ... by public
libraries, including acquisition decisions accomplished by blocking certain Internet sites."
Manns, supra note 101, at 680. In addition, the decision stands for the idea that "government
need not be neutral toward pornography." Berg & Laycock, supra note 58, at 236 n.62. As the
Court itself made the point: "Especially because public libraries have traditionally excluded
pornographic material from their other collections, Congress could reasonably impose a paral-
lel limitation on its Internet assistance programs [for public libraries]." Am. Library Ass', 539
U.S. at 212.
130 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 719 (2004) (emphasis added).
131 461 U.S. 540, 546 (1983) ("Congress has not infringed any First Amendment rights
.... Congress has simply chosen not to pay for ... lobbying.").
132 523 U.S. 666, 683 (1998).
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clergy," i.e., as an exclusion defined not by the viewpoint of the ma-
jor, but by the likely clerical vocations of students who pursue such a
course of study.
This reading of the opinion, however, creates problems of its own.
First, it does not square with the clear facts of Davey, because it is in-
disputable that the exclusion was triggered by the viewpoint from
which theology was taught, and not by the career goals of students.'
Davey was excluded from the Program only because he chose to study
theology from a devotional or believing perspective.1 3 4 Moreover, us-
ing devotional theology as a proxy for the class of students studying
for the priesthood or the clergy is both overinclusive and underinclu-
sive. It is overinclusive because some devotional theology majors do
not pursue ecclesiastical careers; and it is underinclusive because,
undoubtedly, some students who major in "non-devotional" theology
or in some other subject do end up serving as professional clerics. T6
Under the First Amendment, the State of Washington may not
achieve the goal of denying scholarships to students studying for ec-
clesiastical careers by discriminating against private educative speech
on the basis of viewpoint.
133 Davey, 540 U.S. at 717 (describing the administration of the scholarship program); see also
Declaration of Eugene Webb, supra note 19, at 85 (discussing the University of Washington's
policy of teaching about religion exclusively from a "historical and.., scholarly point of view").
134 See Davey, 540 U.S. at 717 (stating that in order to receive his Promise Scholarship funds,
Davey was required to certify that he was not pursuing a "devotional theology degree").
135Just as all English literature majors do not become English teachers or professional novel-
ists or poets, not all devotional theology majors become professional clerics. Joshua Davey him-
self is a perfect example. Davey attends Harvard Law School and he intends to use his legal
education to continue "the fight for religious freedom and equal access to education." Joshua
Davey, Faith in the Law, 4 EDUC. NEXT 84 (2004).
136 See Dokupil, supra note 37, at 355 ("Further, ministry students may not necessarily major
in theology. The formulaic exclusion of theology majors does not functionally protect the tax-
payer's conscience in the manner the state intended."); see also Berg & Laycock, supra note 58,
at 230 n.18 ("The Court never justified its step of equating devotional theology majors with fu-
ture clergy. Devotional theology majors may be the best available proxy for prospective clergy,
because asking students directly whether they plan to become clergy is both intrusive and likely
to produce some inaccurate answers and predictions. But the fact that the question would be
intrusive is an indicator of the inappropriateness of singling out clergy students for exclusion
from the program.").
In addition, some denominations may be more likely than others to employ priests and pas-
tors who have studied theology from a non-devotional perspective. Thus, the distinction in the
Promise Scholarship Program between devotional and non-devotional theology majors raises
serious questions about impermissible denominational discrimination under the Establishment
Clause. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) ("The clearest command of the Estab-
lishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over an-
other.").
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C. What Goes Around, Comes Around: Scholarship Restrictions Based upon
Secular Viewpoints and Footnote Three
I believe Chief Justice Rehnquist's unreasoned dictum in Footnote
Three of Davey is unsupportable under the Court's free speech juris-
prudence; it should be rejected by the Court when the question is ac-
tually presented in a future case. However, if Footnote Three be-
comes law, then it is not only religious viewpoints that are at risk of
suppression from restrictions in government scholarship programs
for higher education.
For example, a scholarship program that funds all majors "except
gender studies from a feminist perspective" should fare no better
than one that excludes "devotional theology majors." This is true for
two reasons. First, it is true because the Court has explicitly held, in
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette,1 37 that "private reli-
gious speech ... is as fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as
secular private expression. """ Second, it is also true because Chief
Justice Rehnquist's dictum in Footnote Three does not state a special
rule permitting funding restrictions on private religious speech, but
instead merely proclaims that the Free Speech Clause is inapplicable
because a scholarship program "is not a forum for speech." If a
scholarship program is not a forum for speech, then it is not a forum
regardless of whether the funding restrictions exclude religious view-
points or secular viewpoints; the Free Speech Clause is simply inap-
plicable. 1
40
Although it might be argued that the Establishment Clause some-
times requires states to disfavor private religious expression, 41 that ar-
gument does not support reading Footnote Three as applying only to
scholarship restrictions on religious majors, because it is clear that it
is permissible under the Establishment Clause for states to include
devotional theology majors under scholarships like Washington's
Promise Program. The issue here is whether the Free Speech
Clause permits states to single out religious expression for less (or
more) protection than the religion clauses require. In other words,
this issue arises only when a state provides more disestablishment of
137 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
13 Id. at 760 (citations omitted).
19 Davey, 540 U.S. at 720 n.3.
140 But see supra notes 86-111 and accompanying text (explaining why a scholarship program
is indeed a forum for speech).
141 Pinette, 515 U.S. at 761-62 ("There is no doubt that compliance with the Establishment
Clause is a state interest sufficiently compelling to justify content-based restrictions on [reli-
gious] speech." (citations omitted)).
142 See Davey, 540 U.S. at 719 ("[T]here is no doubt that the State could, consistent with the
Federal Constitution, permit Promise Scholars to pursue a degree in devotional theology.").
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private religious speech than the Establishment Clause mandates, or
more protection of private religious speech than the Free Exercise
Clause provides.
Thus, when state law provides greater protection for the free ex-
ercise of religion than the Free Exercise Clause would provide under
Smith and Lukumi, "the question arises whether... individuals en-
gaged in religiously-motivated expression must be granted exemp-
tions from content-neutral speech regulations that would be constitu-
tionally applied to other speakers expressing secular messages. ,143
Suppose, for example, that a city enacts a constitutionally permissible
ordinance prohibiting all targeted residential picketing; and suppose
further that a person engaged in religiously-motivated residential
picketing seeks a preferential accommodation under a state law pro-
tecting religious liberty even against burdens imposed by laws of gen-
eral application. " Would it violate the Free Speech Clause for state
courts to grant this exemption? Professor Brownstein argues persua-
sively that "[g]ranting an exemption from content-neutral speech
regulations for religiously motivated expression would violate ... the
Free Speech Clause," because allowing religious residential picketing
while prohibiting secular residential picketing "would constitute con-
tent and viewpoint discrimination prohibited by the Free Speech
Clause. 145  Brownstein concludes that "[a]ccordingly, neither the
state nor any of its agencies or political subdivisions can provide relig-
iously motivated speech immunity from regulatory requirements that
are applied to secular speakers and speech."
Brownstein's argument is powerful, and it applies with equal force
to the opposite side of the coin: neither may a state nor any of its
agencies or subdivisions provide secular speakers and speech immu-
nity from regulatory requirements that are applied to religious
speakers and speech. Michael McConnell has captured the govern-
ing principle lucidly:
Finally, in the context of both regulation and spending, it is necessary
to take into consideration other constitutional values that may be at stake
in particular cases. A clear example of this idea is religious speech. It is
undoubtedly true that speech is a component of religious exercise, how-
ever, when a conflict centers on the right of free speech, the proper re-
14 Alan E. Brownstein, State RFRA Statutes and Freedom of Speech, 32 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 605,
609 (1999). The converse issue is presented when state law mandates more disestablishment of
private religious speech than required under the Establishment Clause. In this case, the ques-
tion is whether other speakers expressing secular messages may be granted expressive opportu-
nities from which individuals engaged in religious expression are excluded.
144 See, e.g., id. at 609-10 (explaining how a religiously-motivated protestor of abortion might
be more protected under state law than a secular protestor at the same location).
145 Id. at 643.
146 Id.
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suit is affected by the content and viewpoint neutrality requirements of
the Free Speech Clause. Thus, whether religious claimants are seeking
special treatment, or seeking equal access to a public forum or its finan-
cial equivalent, the governing principle will be one of equal treatment,
not of accommodation or of separation. Favoring religious speakers over
similarly situated nonreligious speakers [or nonreligious speakers over
similarly situated religious speakers] would violate the viewpoint-
neutrality requirement of the Free Speech Clause. 
147
The bottom line is that whatever free speech rules govern dis-
criminatory exclusion of religious viewpoints from generally applica-
ble scholarship and other funding programs will also govern the ex-
clusion from such programs of secular viewpoints. Students who are
excluded from a scholarship program because they are pursuing a
major in gender studies from a feminist perspective will fare no better
and no worse under the Free Speech Clause than Joshua Davey and
devotional theology majors.
CONCLUSION
In Locke v. Davey, the Supreme Court was confronted with a state
scholarship program that targeted a small religious minority-
students who major in theology from a devotional or believing per-
spective-for discriminatory exclusion from scholarship funding. Al-
though the question presented to the Supreme Court was limited to
Davey's free exercise claim, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opin-
ion contains dictum also purporting to dispose of issues concerning
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination under the Free Speech
Clause. 1
48
The Court's free exercise decision, although extremely narrow
and explicitly limited to "the Promise Scholarship Program as cur-
rently operated by the State of Washington," 4 9 is troubling because it
allows a state to target a small group of religious students for exclu-
sion from a scholarship program open to all other students and all
other courses of study. The Court seems to be saying that Davey was
seeking too much too soon, by asking the Court to declare that equal
treatment for devotional theology students in scholarship funding
was not only permissible under the Establishment Clause, but re-
quired under the Free Exercise Clause. Thus, the Court held that, at
least for the present, there must be room for "play in the joints" be-
tween the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses for the states to
decide whether to use tax funds for the vocational training of the
147 Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REv. 1, 40 (2000)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
14 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720 n.3 (2004).
149 Id. at 725.
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clergy.15° This Article speculates that, in the fullness of time, Davey
will probably be understood as a narrow and temporary pause on the
Court's inexorable journey toward neutrality under the religion
clauses.
The primary focus of this Article has been on free speech issues
that were technically not within the question presented to the Court
in Davey. In brief and largely unreasoned dictum in Footnote Three
of his majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected Davey's con-
tention that the exclusion of devotional theology majors from the
Promise Scholarship Program was an "unconstitutional viewpoint re-
striction on speech." 5' The Court asserted that the Promise Scholar-
ship Program was "not a forum for speech," because its purpose was
to help needy families pay for college, not to "encourage a diversity of
views from private speakers.' 2 Thus, the Free Speech Clause does
not even apply to viewpoint-based exclusions from government fund-
ing of scholarships for postsecondary education.
Under Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia1 53 and
Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,154 government may not discriminate on
the basis of viewpoint in the context of a funding program if the pro-
gram is designed "to encourage a diversity of views from private
speakers" 55 or "to facilitate private speech, not to promote a govern-
mental message. '056 Viewpoint discrimination is strongly disfavored
under the Free Speech Clause, even in the context of funding pro-
grams, because it strikes at the core of the First Amendment's most
basic values. This is particularly true when the viewpoint discrimina-
tion attacks intellectual freedom in the marketplace of ideas that ex-
ists in our colleges and universities.
This Article analyzed Chief Justice Rehnquist's Footnote Three
dictum, and concluded that the Promise Scholarship Program in
Davey was clearly designed to encourage Promise Scholars to choose
from an infinitely broad array of subjects, viewpoints, and courses of
study that make up the marketplace of ideas of higher education in
the State of Washington. Since the exclusion of devotional theology
majors from the Program was clearly based on the viewpoint from
which theology is taught and studied, and since it is clear that gov-
ernment may not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint-even in the
context of a funding program-if the program is designed to encour-
150 See id. at 718-19 ("[T]here are some state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause
but not required by the Free Exercise Clause.").
151 Id. at 720 n.3.
152 Id.
153 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
14 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
155 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834.
1% Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542.
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However, if Chief Justice Rehnquist is right-and I am wrong-
about the constitutionality of viewpoint discrimination in scholarship
programs, then it is important to recognize that it is not only reli-
gious viewpoints that may be targeted by government scholarship
programs for higher education. Other unpopular or controversial
majors-gender studies from a feminist perspective, for example-
should fare no better than devotional theology majors under Chief
Justice Rehnquist's dictum in Footnote Three. If the dictum in Davey
becomes law, everyone who values the university as a haven for free
intellectual inquiry will lose, because viewpoint discrimination in
scholarship funding programs severely distorts the academic market-
place of ideas in colleges and universities. When the government
broke its promise to Joshua Davey, it also broke faith with everyone
who values religious liberty and intellectual freedom.
